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From ape empathy to human morality? 
 
Abstract: 
The idea that empathy provides an important developmental precursor to moral decision making 
possesses significant conceptual appeal. However, the idea of a necessary, diachronic relation 
between empathy and morality has been rejected recently (by Prinz 2011, amongst others). This 
paper reassesses the strength of the claim that empathy is developmentally necessary for (at least 
some forms of) morality and argues that the position remains a live possibility.  
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From ape empathy to human morality?1 
 
1)  Introduction 
 
The idea that empathy provides an important developmental precursor to moral decision making 
possesses significant conceptual appeal. However, the idea of a necessary relation between 
empathy and morality has been rejected recently. For instance, Jesse Prinz (2011) poses the 
question ‘Is empathy necessary for morality?’ and he suggests that there are three ways one might 
give a positive answer to this question: 
i. empathy is necessary for moral judgement 
ii. empathy is necessary for moral development 
iii. empathy is necessary for moral motivation 
He then argues against each of (i-iii) and concludes that empathy is not necessary for morality 
(though other emotional states may be). In this note I want to re-evaluate the case for position 
(ii) and suggest that it remains a live possibility. 
 
2)  The case against empathy as necessary for moral development 
 
Empathy is closely related to emotional contagion on the one hand and perspective taking on the 
other. It involves feeling what another is feeling, a vicarious experience of a situation as if one 
were in the place of another (see Decety and Lamm 2006 for a useful comparison of various 
definitions of empathy). Due to its connection with emotional contagion – the well-attested 
phenomenon whereby we ‘catch’ the elements of our own emotional state from the emotional 
states of those around us (see Simner 1971, Thompson 1981) – it seems at least prima facie 
plausible to think of empathy as a quite low-level, cognitively undemanding capacity, and thus it 
                                                          
1 Thanks are due to my colleagues in the Philosophy Department and in the Centre for Cognition Research at 
Reading, and to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. 
3 
 
might be thought to provide a developmental route into more sophisticated perspective-taking 
tasks and the more abstract or impartial concerns which are the hallmark of some kinds of moral 
reasoning.2 Prinz defines position (ii) as “the possibility that empathy plays a diachronic role: 
[empathic] emotions may be necessary for the development of the capacity to make moral 
judgements in the first place” (2011: 217), so empathy provides an answer to the question of 
what allows a child who lacks a moral capacity to develop a moral capacity.3 Of course, this 
position makes no prediction about the role of empathy in any specific exercise of the moral 
capacity itself once it has developed (unlike positions (i) and (iii) above). Thus, as Prinz points 
out, position (ii) is difficult to test experimentally. Discovery of a given instance of moral 
judgement without empathetic reasoning would not disprove (ii) but, on the other hand, even if 
we discovered that children typically did engage in empathetic reasoning when making moral 
judgements, this would only show a correlation between empathy and moral judgements, it would 
not show there was a causal or necessary relation between the two. Instead, then, Prinz suggests 
that advocates of (ii) should look to pathological cases for empirical support for their view, for if 
empathetic capacities are lost or impaired (ii) predicts that moral capacity will be similarly lost or 
impaired.  
In this respect, Prinz examines work from Blair 1995 which looks at moral development 
in psychopaths. Psychopathic conditions are characterised by a lack of empathy and Blair shows 
that moral understanding in this population is also compromised, thus loss of empathy correlates 
                                                          
2 As a reviewer pointed out, the extent to which empathy can be thought of as a relatively low-level capacity is open 
to question since, unlike emotional contagion, empathy does seem to be sensitive to higher-order metalizing; for 
instance, empathic reactions may be affected by a subject’s understanding of a social situation. (On this point, it is 
interesting to note that the same holds for other putatively low-level interpersonal states, such as mirroring or 
imitation. As Piotr Winkielman has shown, though we often mirror one another in terms of bodily posture, facial 
expression, etc., this mirroring is sensitive to apparently higher-order mental states, such as the subject’s beliefs 
about the power relations in play – we are more likely to mirror some individual X if we believe X is of high-status 
in the context.) Clearly, then, to fully substantiate the view that empathic responses could be a more basic 
developmental pre-cursor to moral reasoning further work on the relationship between empathy and theory of mind 
would be needed. Unfortunately, however, this is beyond the scope of the current note.  
3 Note that position (ii) need not be committed to the view that empathy is necessary for all forms of moral 
development. For instance, it might be held that prohibition moral reasoning (where sanctions and rules are to the 
fore, see below) can develop without empathy, while prosocial moral reasoning demands empathy. It is this weaker 
position – that empathy is necessary for at least some forms of moral development – that I will focus on in what 
follows.  
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with impairments in moral development. This leads Blair to a positive claim about the 
developmental relationship between empathy and morality: he holds that typically developing 
children have an innate tendency to empathize with the distress of conspecifics and thus are 
disposed to ‘feel bad’ when they witness the suffering or distress of another. This bad feeling, 
Blair suggests, acts as a ‘violence inhibition mechanism’, causing a subject to desist from actions 
which cause distress and, in general, to associate bad feelings with actions of this kind. In this 
way, the claim is, distress gets associated with moral rules about prohibited or bad behaviour.  
Prinz then goes on to reject Blair’s view on the following grounds: 
1) It is not clear that there is such thing as a ‘violence inhibition mechanism’. 
2) Many of the moral behaviours we learn involve non-violent behaviours (e.g. don’t lie), 
thus a violence-inhibition mechanism cannot be at the heart of them. 
3) Typically developing children draw the moral/conventional distinction well before they 
associate empathy with morality, so empathy can’t ground moral understanding. 
4) While it is true that pathological cases characterised by a lack of empathy (i.e. 
psychopathy) also show a marked inhibition of moral understanding, these deficits may 
be two down-stream results of a more general impairment, rather than standing in a 
causal relation to one another. 
Prinz’s final conclusion on position (ii) is then that: 
Given the availability of this alternative explanation [in (4)], Blair’s hypothesis that empathy is necessary for 
moral development is in need of further support. And given the fact that empathy enters into moral 
discourse fairly late in development, this alternative explanation is to be preferred. Young children are 
empathetic, but there is little evidence linking their empathetic responses to their capacity to make moral 
judgements. (218)…[Overall] the hypothesis that empathy is necessary for moral conduct – or even 
important – enjoys little support. (222). 
So, should we accept Prinz’s negative conclusion that empathy is not necessary for moral 
development? Well, a first point to note is that, of the four objections Prinz gives, objections (1) 
and (2) challenge only Blair’s specific version of position (ii). An alternative account of the 
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mechanism by which morality and empathy are connected (i.e. not in terms of a ‘violence 
inhibition mechanism’) might well avoid these two objections (I’ll return to the possibility of 
such an alternative mechanism in §3). It is objections (3) and (4) then which provide the real 
challenge to position (ii). 
Yet objection (3), which obviously has wider appeal than (1) and (2), is given only very 
brief support in Prinz’s paper. He notes work from Smetana & Braeges 1990 showing sensitivity 
to the moral/conventional distinction before children are 3 years old, and work from Eisenberg-
Berg 1979 which, it is suggested, “shows that empathy does not enter actively into moral 
reasoning until high school” (i.e. after age 13); Prinz 2011: 218. If this is correct, it does indeed 
seem to show that empathy cannot ground moral reasoning, since moral reasoning is active well 
before empathy is linked to it. However, I think there are reasons to question this interpretation 
of Eisenberg-Berg’s work.  
In the experiment conducted in Eisenberg-Berg 1979, 125 elementary and high school 
children in the US were given four stories (the stories were read to the children while they were 
also able to look at a written version) in which the child had to decide how a subject should act 
in a situation where the subject’s needs or desires conflicted with the needs or desires of a target. 
Children were asked how the subject should act and why, and their answers were coded 
according to the kind of answer and reason given (e.g. the extent to which the answer involved 
empathic reasoning, needs-orientated reasoning, reciprocation-based reasoning, hedonistic 
concerns, etc.). The findings revealed that the older high school children used strongly empathic 
reasoning more than the younger elementary school children: “Stereotyped images of good and 
bad persons and interpersonally or approval-orientated moral reasoning decreased in frequency 
with age, whereas clearly empathic considerations and judgements reflecting internalised values 
increased with age” (1979: 135).  
However it seems possible that the experimental structure used by Eisenberg-Berg, 
which placed quite a high cognitive load on participants, could have served to depress empathic 
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responses in younger children. Just as paradigm false belief tests are now often held not to be 
revelatory of children’s theory of mind capacities, instead revealing limitations in children’s 
ability to comprehend and respond to complex linguistic tasks (see, e.g., Bloom & German 2000, 
Onishi and Baillargeon 2005), so we might think that the methods of probing the nature of 
moral decision making utilised by Eisenberg-Berg do not reveal the true extent of empathic 
reasoning in moral decision making amongst young children, instead revealing something about 
the ability of children under the age of 13 to conceptualise, comprehend and respond to 
complicated experimental loads. For all four of the stories used required quite a substantial act of 
mental projection: the children were first required to put themselves into the shoes of the (adult) 
protagonist of each story, and then from that perspective assess whether or not the targets 
exerted an empathic pull on the subject. The experiments also required an empathic response to 
an imagined, and often abstract, other, rather than to a visually presented real subject (so any 
aspect of automatic emotional contagion was missing from the scenarios presented). This again 
might be thought to serve to supress empathic responses in younger children. 
For instance, in one story, a poor village with just enough food to feed itself was asked to 
give food to a neighbouring village which had lost all its crops to flood; children were then asked 
‘what should the poor village do?’. However, this is far removed from the kind of immediate 
response to another where empathy has its most natural home: those in need are abstract, 
faceless others and the unit to help them is not a single individual but the village as a whole. It 
would be unsurprising if this kind of scenario failed to elicit empathy-based moral reasoning 
amongst young children, whose ‘empathy-circle’ as it were (i.e. the cases where the needs of 
another elicit empathy), may initially be quite small (with the idea that those we don’t know and 
can’t see can and should elicit our empathy being a significant cognitive achievement rather than 
an immediate empathic response). As noted at the outset, an advocate of position (ii) does not 
need to hold that any given moral judgement must involve an act of empathy – once moral 
reasoning is up and running, subjects may exercise their moral capacity with no appeal to 
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empathy – and it may well be no surprise that the village scenario is one where young children 
deploy non-empathetic means to arrive at a moral judgement.4 
To really assess the extent to which young children do use empathic responses as part of 
their moral reasoning, experimental prompts must control for conflating features which might 
otherwise disguise empathic reasoning.5 So, test scenarios should mirror normal, age-appropriate 
situations which the children might actually encounter and they should engage the child herself 
as agent, rather than requiring mental projection to an alternative subject. It would also be more 
appropriate for scenarios to provide a visual presentation of the potential empathic target. More 
abstract tasks, like those posed by Eisenberg-Berg, leave open the possibility that empathic 
reasoning does in fact form a significant part of young children’s typical moral reasoning, but its 
presence is being disguised or depressed by the more cognitively demanding aspects of the task. 
Finally, even given the above concerns about experimental design, it is worth noting that 
Eisenberg-Berg’s findings are not in fact (contra Prinz) inconsistent with the idea that empathy is 
developmentally necessary for morality. For although she finds greater use of empathic reasoning 
amongst older children, Eisenberg-Berg’s conclusion is that: 
Empathic moral concerns comprised much of the elementary school and high school subjects’ moral 
reasoning. Indeed, even the second-graders in the present study frequently verbalised much needs-
orientated reasoning (i.e. statements such as ‘I’d help because he’s hungry’). Since needs-orientated 
reasoning intercorrelated with and loaded on the same factor as clearly empathic considerations, it is logical 
                                                          
4 The other scenarios were similarly problematic: in the second scenario, an individual is asked to give blood 
regularly over a period of time, despite suffering serious loss if they do so (they will lose their job, disrupt their 
studies, etc.). Yet this kind of long-term commitment to providing indirect help to another is not the kind of 
situation likely to tap empathic moral reasoning amongst younger children, even were it to be a feature of other 
moral judgements made at this age. The third scenario involved a subject helping another who is being mugged, but 
this again requires a significant act of mental projection on behalf of the children before they can engage in an 
empathic response (the children must first imagine that they are someone who is capable of making a difference 
during a mugging before considering their response to the other, and empathic responses may well be supressed due 
to fear of physical harm to the self). The fourth and final scenario involved a swimmer choosing between helping 
disabled children and training to win a swimming competition. While this scenario perhaps gets closest to the kind 
of situation which might really prompt an empathic response in young children, it still involves comprehension of a 
complex and unusual situation, mental projection and an empathic response to an imagined other rather than a real 
subject, all of which might serve to prompt the use of non-empathetic strategies in the moral reasoning of young 
children. 
5 As things currently stand then, Prinz’s suggestion that “empathy enters into moral discourse fairly late in 
development” (219) might perhaps be thought to run foul of the old adage that absence of evidence is not evidence 
of absence. 
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to conclude that such reasoning represents a primitive empathic orientation…[B]oth empirical (Damon 
[1971]) and anecdotal (Hoffman 1975) evidence support the assertion that empathic responding plays an 
important role in the early development of a prosocial orientation. (1979: 135-6) 
Indeed, this claim forms a key element of what I take to be the main hypothesis of Eisenberg-
Berg’s paper, namely that prosocial moral reasoning (where the needs of the subject conflict with 
the needs of a target in a situation where rules, etc., are not to the fore) may develop in a 
different way to prohibition moral reasoning (where laws, etc., are to the fore). Since for position 
(ii) to be viable it need not be that empathy is necessary for all forms of moral development (e.g. 
if it underpins only prosocial moral reasoning this would, I would suggest, be sufficient), these 
findings seem at the very least to be consistent with position (ii).  
 Turning finally to objection (4), Prinz is of course right to note that impairment cases 
cannot demonstrate conclusively that empathy is necessary for moral development, since the loss 
of empathy and the loss of moral capacity could well be joint effects of some up-stream 
impairment. Indeed, in general appeals to impairment cases seem problematic in terms of 
evidencing a philosophical theory here. For psychopaths present a complex array of behaviours 
and display a range of deficits which make it unlikely that the condition can be understood in 
terms of a single dimension of loss along which the psychopathic population can be understood. 
Given this, the most that could be shown by examination of the psychopathic population would 
be the negative claim: if a population which is characterised (at least in part) via impairment to or 
absence of the capacity for empathy were found to have an unimpaired capacity for moral 
understanding, this would suffice to show that empathy was not necessary for moral 
understanding. Since this is not what we find with psychopaths, these impairment cases leave 
open the possibility that empathy is indeed necessary for (some kinds of) moral understanding. 
 Thus, while Prinz is clearly right that none of the points surveyed thus far conclusively 
show that empathy is necessary for moral development, he is wrong, I think, to claim that the 
position is ruled out, or indeed that it enjoys little support. First, as Prinz himself notes (2011: 
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217), “Conceptually, this idea has much appeal”: given that empathy appears to be quite a low-
level cognitive capacity, and given its connection to an appreciation of the position of another, 
the idea that empathy could provide a route into moral concern does seem appealing. Second, 
while Smetana and Braeges (1990) show that the moral/conventional distinction is grasped very 
early (before the third birthday), there is, as far as I know, no evidence that this predates 
children’s empathic responses. For instance, by one year of age children spontaneously comfort 
one another on witnessing another’s distress (Zahn-Waxler et al 1990) and from a very young 
age children seek to punish cheats or freeloaders, importantly even if the target has cheated on 
someone other than themselves (where it is plausible that the conception of the other as the 
victim in an exchange is grounded at least in part on empathy with the injured party; see Hamlin 
et al 2007, Hamlin and Wynn 2011). There is no evidence then that moral understanding is 
developmentally earlier than empathic understanding. Third, as Eisenberg-Berg’s findings show, 
even very young children do use empathetic responses within their moral reasoning and, as I 
suggested above, her finding that older children apparently have a greater reliance on empathic 
response may in fact be a construct of the experimental settings in play. Given an easier test, we 
might well find that empathic reasoning forms a significant part of moral decision making (of the 
right sort) amongst children of all ages. Furthermore, while studies of impaired populations 
cannot of course prove a causal connection between empathy and morality, the negative 
correlation in these cases (where loss of empathy is accompanied by a compromised moral 
understanding) does serve, I would suggest (contra Prinz 2011), to strengthen a potential 
inference to the best explanation. Given the evidence that even very young children sometimes 
use empathic reasoning in prosocial moral decision making, given that older children make 
extensive use of empathic reasoning in these situations, given the correlation between lack of 
empathy and impaired moral development, and given the extant conceptual appeal of the 
position, it is far too early to close the door on the idea that empathy is necessary for (prosocial) 
moral development.  
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3) Moral development in an individual vs. moral development in a species 
 
Finally, we have been considering the claim that empathy is necessary for moral development, 
but exactly how should this claim be understood? As noted at the outset, Prinz takes position (ii) 
to make a diachronic claim about the conditions necessary for development of a moral capacity 
and he apparently understands this claim in individual terms, i.e. as the question of what is 
required for a given child to move from a lack of moral capacity to a moral capacity. However it 
seems that we might also understand position (ii) not in terms of an individualistic reading but 
rather in terms of a species-level, evolutionary story. In this way, empathy would be held to be a 
necessary pre-cursor of morality because the moral capacity we as a species enjoy evolved on the 
back of the capacity for empathy found in our closest evolutionary ancestors.  
This, I take it, is the kind of appeal to empathy to be found in the work of Frans de 
Waal, who has argued at length that human morality needs to be understood in terms of a 
continuity between our capacities and those to be found amongst apes (and, to a lesser extent, 
monkeys). According to de Waal “human morality is firmly anchored in the social emotions, 
with empathy at its core” (2006: 56). De Waal highlights what he calls ‘cognitive empathy’, i.e. 
the ability to enact an action plan designed to alleviate the suffering of another for no other 
reason than the desire to alleviate that suffering, and he argues that this moral emotion can be 
seen in action in ape behaviour. So a male chimpanzee reaches up to help a distressed youngster 
out of a tree (2006: 41), a young chimpanzee seeks out and holds a distressed male after the 
latter’s defeat in a fight (2006: 33-4), and so on. These natural, other-directed, apparently 
empathy-based behaviours are, de Waal suggests, proto-moral: they provide the building blocks 
from which human morality evolved.6  
                                                          
6 In support of this claim, de Waal 2006: 56 argues that “neuroimaging shows that moral judgement in fact involves 
a wide variety of brain areas, some extremely ancient (Greene and Haidt 2002). In short neuroscience seems to be 
lending support to human morality as evolutionarily anchored in mammalian society.”  
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Obviously any kind of evolutionary story is just that – a story – and evolutionary claims 
in general are open to well-known and far from insignificant challenges (see Plotkin 2004). 
Furthermore, even if we were to embrace this kind of evolutionary story, it would not underpin 
the strongest reading of the necessity claim in position (ii). For even if we held that our moral 
capacity (or some aspect of it) did evolve from the empathy-based capacities of our ancestors, 
this might indicate sufficiency rather than necessity: de facto, human morality required ancestor 
empathy, but other capacities (perhaps other moral emotions, perhaps something else entirely) 
might have been able to play the same role were the capacity for empathy to have been absent. 
Nevertheless by focusing on the role of empathy in the moral development of the individual, 
Prinz 2011 does seem to neglect a potentially attractive version of position (ii), one which 
stresses species-level development over individual development. 
So where does this leave us?  Well, I think a reconsideration of the evidence for a 
connection between empathy and morality shows that Prinz has ruled out position (ii) too soon. 
As long as we are clear that position (ii) is proposing a diachronic not a concurrent dependency 
and that the dependency is limited to certain kinds of moral behaviour (i.e. prosocial not 
prohibition), then I think (ii) remains an attractive position. Moral understanding does not 
appear earlier (in developmental terms) than empathic responses, and the evidence that Prinz 
appeals to to show that younger children do not make appeals to empathic responses in moral 
decision making is compromised.7 Furthermore, older children make significant use of empathic 
responses in forming moral judgements, and there is evidence for a correlation between a lack of 
empathy and impaired moral development. Together with the theoretical appeal of the idea that 
empathic responses provide a first foot-hold for the child on route to moral understanding, all of 
this is sufficient, I think, to show that the position deserves much fuller exploration. Finally, it 
might also be the case that the role of empathy in moral development is best understood at a 
                                                          
7 Note that Eisenberg-Berg 1979 is compromised as an evidence source for claims about the absence of young 
children’s use of empathy in moral reasoning. However, showing this was not the aim of Eisenberg-Berg’s paper 
and the work may thus succeed on its own terms (i.e. as an argument that prosocial moral development follows a 
different trajectory to rule-based moral reasoning). 
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species, rather than an individual, level: perhaps early-ancestor empathy provided an essential 
building-block upon which the edifice of human morality could be built. While ape research on 
the moral emotions remains at a relatively early stage, it is an attractive thought that the kind of 
complex, other-orientated and apparently empathy-based social behaviour of our nearest 
evolutionary relatives is continuous with the full-blown moral behaviour which characterises 
man.8 
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